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Mar.-Apr., 1957
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By HAROLD E. HURST
Professor of Law, University of Denver.
During the period from October, 1955, to the end of 1956, rela-
tively few decisions on points of constitutional law have been
handed down by the Colorado Supreme Court. Important decisions
invalidated minimum resale price maintenance and the motor
vehicle dealer Sunday closing law. In another decision, the court
defined "felony" in a way which reportedly affects a number of
prisoners in the state penitentiary, and in the principal case re-
sulted in the release of one prisoner, convicted under the habitual
criminal statute. Other decisions dealt with self-incrimination,
representation by counsel, exemption of charitable and educational
organizations from the property tax, and refunds of taxes paid into
the old age pension fund.
MINIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
In an unanimous decision in the case of Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp. v. Francis,1 the court ruled that the so-called "non-
signer" clause of the Colorado Fair Trade Act 2 was unconstitutional
for several reasons. The facts of the case are simple. Plaintiff and
Fisher Denver Co., not a party to the action, had entered into a
contract which purportedly obligated Fisher to maintain a minimum
resale price on products manufactured by the plaintiff. The de-
fendant had not signed such an agreement with the plaintiff. The
statute in question provided that, "Wilfully and knowingly ad-
vertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than
the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, whether the person so advertising, offering
for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair
competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby." The defendant, Francis, had lawfully obtained a stock
of merchandise manufactured by the plaintiff, and was reselling
such merchandise at prices less than those established in the
contract between the plaintiff, and Fisher Denver Co. The plain-
tiff sought an injunction and the defendant resisted on the ground
that the restriction on his right to resell at any price was uncon-
stitutional.
After noting that the declared legislative purpose in enacting
the statute was "to safeguard the public against the monopolies
and to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and
discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is
destroyed or prevented,"' the court made it plain that in its view
the police power of the legislature extended to price fixing only of
such businesses as might be said to be "affected with a public in-
terest," and that the business of selling fire arms and ammunition,
1301 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1956).
2Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 55-1-4 (1953).
3 Ibid.
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 55-2-16 (1953).
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the products of the plaintiff, was not affected with a public inter-
est. Rather, it was the opinion of the court that minimum resale
price maintenance was calculated to restrict competition, create a
monopoly, increase prices to consumers, and make a mockery out
of the declared purpose of the Act-to protect consumers. The
non-signer clause of the statute was, therefore, beyond the police
power of the State as applied to the products of the plaintiff.
But, the court went further. It ruled that even if the non-signer
clause could be deemed within the power of the legislature, the
statute must fall as an unlawful delegaion of legislative power to
private individuals without any standards whatsoever within which
-or even whether-minimum resale prices shall be fixed. The
crux of the matter was that "We must look not to the statute, but
to the contract between plaintiff and Fisher to determine the
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minimum price, below which the defendant shall not sell."'5
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS SUNDAY CLOSING LAW
By a bare majority the Supreme Court held invalid the statute
prohibiting operation of new and used car establishments, a de-
cision which, at the time of this writing, was under reconsideration
on a petition for rehearing. The case, Mosko v. Dunbar,6 began as
an action for a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff alleging that
the Sunday closing law, applying only to new and used car dealers,
violated the state constitutional prohibition against special legisla-
tion 7 and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
The court considered the principal question to be:
"Does a statute which prohibits a dealer in motor vehicles
from operating his place of business on Sundays have a real
or substantial relation to the promotion and protection of the
public health, the public morals, the public safety, or the
general welfare of the people?"8
It was not indicated by the court just what provisions of the
Constitutions were violated by the Sunday closing law. The pro-
nouncement simply was that "Application of fundamental princi-
ples of constitutional law compel a negative answer to the ques-
tion."9 The language in which the question and answer were couched
is the standard language of police power and due process of law,
not of special legislation and equal protection. However, in a
special concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sutton expressly declared
the statute invalid as being in violation of both the due process
clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of Article V, section 25, of the state Constitution prohibiting
special legislation. To him, there was no reasonable basis, as a
means of protecting the public health, safety, welfare and morals,
for discriminating against motor vehicle dealers when there were
no more apparent dangers in selling motor vehicles on Sunday
than in selling "houses or tractors, or horses or boats on Sunday."'10
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In People v. Schneider,1 the defendants, being county commis-
sioners, were subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury investi-
gating the affairs of the Board of County Commissioners. They ap-
peared and testified without being advised of their constitutional
immunity from self-incrimination. When indictments were returned
against them for alleged offenses evidenced by the testimony
given and the records produced by the defendants before the
grand jury, the defendants moved that the indictments be quashed.
The trial court granted the motion and the People procured a writ
of error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was in
violation of Article II, Section 18, of the state Constitution for the
State to subpoena and require the giving of testimony by one who
5 301 P.2d at 152.
. 8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 439 (July 30, 1956).
7 Colo. Const. Art. V, § 25 (1876).
'8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Ad,. Sh. at 440.
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 442.
11 133 Colo. 173, 292 P.2d 982 (1956).
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is under investigation and to use the information so obtained in a
criminal proceeding against the witness. This was so even though
it appears that the defendants did not claim immunity at any time
prior to the motion to quash, but where nothing appears in the
record except the giving of the testimony to indicate that the de-
fendants waived the privilege.
In another case in which the privilege against self-incrimination
was invoked,12 the prosecution sought to place a mask on the face
of the defendant, charged with robbery, in the manner in which
such a mask had been worn by the robber. To this, counsel for the
defendant said, "We object to it." When the mask was in place
and the defendant was asked to stand up, counsel interposed, "We
object to his standing up, as being improper." Both objections were
overruled, the defendant was convicted, and in the Supreme Court
the defendant assigned the rulings as error, apparently upon the
ground that such procedure violated the prohibition against com-
pelling a person to testify against himself.13 The reason for affirm-
ing the rulings of the trial court seems to be that unless reasons
for the objections are obvious, the grounds therefor must be stated
with sufficient particularity as to call the attention of the court
to the specific points relied upon, and only the grounds specified
need be considered. However, the court ruled that even if a proper
objection had been interposed, no constitutional right of the de-
fendant had been violated. The prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion was said to relate to testimonial evidence, not to the exclusion
of the body as evidence when such evidence may be relevant and
material.
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
One case reached the court in which it was called upon to de-
cide the adequacy of counsel in a murder trial." At the arraignment
of the defendant, a member of the bar of New Mexico appeared
for the defendant and entered a plea of not guilty. The lawyer was
admitted by order of the Supreme Court to represent the defendant
in the trial. Upon trial, a verdict of guilty was returned. On writ
of error prosecuted by new counsel of the Colorado bar, it was
assigned as error that the trial court failed to appoint competent
12 Vigil v. People, 300 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1956).
tm
Colo. Const. Art. II, § 18 (1876).
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local counsel. The contention was that the representation of the
defendant was obviously inadequate and that trial of the defendant
under the circumstances was a denial of due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment and a violation of Article II, Section 16,
of the state Constitution. Without discussion or statement of rea-
sons specifically addressed to the constituional questions, the
court simply held that there was no constitutional error.
EXEMPTION FROM STATE PROPERTY TAXES
In a case of first impression in Colorado, the Supreme Court
decided the applicability of the constitutional exemption of property
of charitable, religious and educational organizations from state
property taxes, where the organization and the users of the property
are non-residents of the State. 15 The plaintiff, Young Life Cam-
paign, was a Texas non-profit corporation which owned ranches in
Colorado allegedly used solely for benevolent, educational and re-
ligious purposes. Of the entire attendance at the summertime pro-
grams of the corporation, only about two percent came from
Colorado. Property taxes were collected from the plaintiff who
brought this action to recover back the taxes, claiming exemption
under the Colorado Constitution which provides:
"The following classes of property shall be exempt from gen-
eral taxation:
2. The property, real and personal, that is used solely and
exclusively for religious worship ...
4. Property, real and personal, that is used for strictly
charitable purposes."'16
Although the evidence showed that there was some use of the
properties in question by vacationers on a commercial basis, the
court passed the question whether the properties were used "solely
and exclusively" for religious worship or "strictly" charitable pur-
poses and held that:
"it was not the intention of the people of the State of Colo-
rado by the adoption of its constitutional provision . . .or by
legislative act to relieve a non-profit foreign corporation, be it
charitable, religious or educational, of the payment of taxes and
' sYoung Life Campaign v. Board of County Com'rs. 300 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1956).
6Colo. Const., Art. X, § 5 (1876).
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thereby increase the tax burden upon its resident taxpay-
ers . ... 17
The conclusion was based on the theory that the intent and purpose
of the exemption was to relieve from taxation only those organiza-
tions which contributed to the welfare of Colorado citizens, re-
lieving the State of such burdens. Since the benefits provided by
the plaintiff were enjoyed almost entirely by non-residents, the
corporation did not qualify as one to which the Constitution ex-
tended exemption.
"FELONY" DEFINED
The Colorado Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 4, provides
that "The term felony, wherever it may occur in this constitution,
or the laws of the State, shall be construed to mean any criminal
offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary,
and none other." In Smalley v. People 18 the court set aside a life
sentence imposed under the habitual criminal statute for a fourth
conviction of a felony. Smalley contended that his first conviction
for burglary and grand larceny were not convictions for felonies
because at the time he was under the age of twenty-one years and
the statutes"' substituted imprisonment in the reformatory for im-
prisonment in the penitentiary. The court set aside the life sentence
without discussion beyond stating in effect that the language
of the Constitution was plain and should be construed in favor of
the accused.
REFUNDS OF TAXES FROM OLD AGE PENSION FUND
The Constitution, providing that "all money deposited in the
old age pension fund shall remain inviolate for the purpose for
which created, and no part thereof shall be transferred to any other
fund or used or appropriated for any other purpose," 2 does not
prevent the refund of taxes erroneously paid into the fund. In
State v. Newton 2 the Supreme Court held that the Article applies
only to taxes lawfully assessed and paid, not to taxes erroneously
assessed and paid on the theory that the constitutional provision
extended only to taxes lawfully or properly deposited in the fund.
"' 300 P.2d at 543.
18304 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1956).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 39-10-1 (1953).
"Colo. Const. Art. XXIV, § 7 (1876).
218 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 205 (1956).
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